Iran: A Different Type of Regime Change - Yahya Sadowski / Theodore Karasik

Mr. Yahya Sadowski, Director, Country Strategies, PFC Energy
Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director, Research and Development, INEGMA

Introduction
"Persian" émigrés and Western journalists sometimes argue that the "green revolution" -- the public protests that followed Iran's hotly contested presidential elections in June 2009 -- might result in regime change. They imply that the Islamic Republic is on its last legs and that it might be replaced by a Western-style liberal democracy. In reality, the forces of democratization are probably past their peak in Iran. If the Islamic Republic is replaced by anything in the next few years, it will probably be an Islamic Dictatorship.

Stepping Back From Democratization
Although it is not widely recognized, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 actually marked a step in the direction of genuine democracy in Iran. It replaced the Shah's autocracy with a system of government that - while intolerant and anti-American - did actually listen to voters who were polled regularly and meaningfully. One of the major shortcomings of the Iranian government, however, is that there was nothing to prevent the majority from tyrannizing the minority: there was no clear system of individual rights or guarantees of the rule of law. It is precisely this shortcoming that gave rise to the "reformist" movement that elected Mohammad Khatami president in 1997, and that supported Mir-Hossein Mousavi in the electoral campaign of June 2009.

This movement, supported largely by young, educated and relatively privileged urbanites, has continued to protest the last round of flawed elections, hoping that their demonstrations will force political liberalization. As always, Western observers have projected too many of their own hopes onto this movement. A majority of Iranian reformists are still anti-American and support the development of Iran's nuclear program. But they are less intolerant than their rivals in Iranian politics. These rivals include social conservatives who think that Iran is already far too tolerant, that people should not be allowed to drink alcohol or let unrelated men and women mingle in private. They also include political conservatives, who think that tolerating a diversity of opinion in the media encourages political discontent and allows Iran's enemies to infiltrate the country.

The conservative coalition that rules Iran today contains at least three distinct elements. First there are the populists who support President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These are largely village voters, who want to see the government subsidies that have primarily benefited the prosperous and urban population transformed into a different array of subsidies that will target the poor and rural population. Another, more compact but far more influential group, includes the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij (paramilitary volunteers) and the employees of the many public sector companies that they have come to dominate. These men seek a more activist, centrally-controlled government, freed from the checks and balances that have paralyzed the Iranian leadership to date.
Finally, at the very top, there is the "Supreme Leader" Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i and his many clients, particularly among the clergy. These men worry not only that Iran was becoming too liberal but that balloting was slowly undermining the many privileges of the Leader himself. These conservatives (who probably would have won anyway) conspired to steal the June elections. Since then, they have worked together to suppress the reformists and to stifle dissent. And despite the coverage that Iran's new "green revolution" gets in the Western press, they are largely succeeding. The conservatives control the military, the police, the mainstream media and the "commanding heights "of the economy. They are gradually asserting their authority over the oil sector, where one of their rivals (former President current Expediency Council head Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) has long been influential. They have the enthusiastic support of most villagers and many of the urban poor - probably a majo
An Authoritarian Revolution
The conservatives, in fact, probably intend to do much more than just suppress the reformists. They are gradually edging toward abolishing much of the progress toward democracy (however imperfect) that occurred during the 1979 revolution. They are laying the groundwork for a new type of authoritarianism in Iran.

The exact character of this new authoritarianism has not been decided, because it is not yet clear which faction among the conservatives will prevail. Ahmadinejad, since he actually does well at the polls, might maintain some of the appurtenances of democracy (such as periodic ballots) while hounding his enemies from the country: an Iranian version of Chavismo. The Revolutionary Guard might prefer a straightforward military regime, perhaps buying popular support with a land reform program, like the Arab military dictatorships of the 1950s. Khamene'i's preference, of course, would be for autocracy.

In Iran, where religion has been thoroughly politicized, each of these developments has different implications for the clergy. One of the factors that has recently weakened the reformists is the death of their pre-eminent clerical ally, Ayatollah Hosein-Ali Montazeri. (The only other Grand Ayatollah to be consistently sympathetic to the reformists is Ayatollah Yousef Saane'i, whose base is in Esfahan and who lacks a truly national network.) Ahmadinejad is a devoted follower of Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who heads a cultish and avowedly reactionary messianic movement that is viewed with suspicion by many. (Not only is Mesbah-Yazdi the only Ayatollah to support Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, he actually advocates the revival of slavery.) Finally, Ayatollah Khamene'i is, of course, his own primary spiritual guide, although neither he nor Mesbah-Yazdi have attained the rank of grand ayatollah. The Revolutionary Guards, too, are technically loyal to Khamene'i, b
Conclusion
For the West, it may not actually matter which of these factions comes out on top. None of them, for example, is likely to be able to retreat from Iran's insistence that it has the right to pursue its own nuclear program. Indeed, the reformists also share that principle. None of them is eager to normalize relations with the United States. Fortunately, none of them is actually eager for war with Washington either, although all of them might benefit from the resulting explosion of nationalist sentiments. None of them particularly favor economic liberalization. The foremost advocates of a more open economy are often supporters of former President Rafsanjani, who is not popular among either the reformers or the conservatives. For the Gulf states, there is a certain uneasiness about what is ongoing. On the one hand there is a certain amount of glee at seeing the Islamic revolution teeter and face the probabilities of change. But on the other hand there is concern that the Iranian