Don’t overrate Russian moves in Syria - Michael Young - The Daily Star
Russia has a plan for Syria, while the United States does not. That much we know. However, one shouldn’t exaggerate in praising President Vladimir Putin’s political cunning. The Russian plan for Syria is full of holes; it is also extremely risky.
On the plus side what has Russia achieved? Putin recognized the absence of a cohesive Syria policy in Europe and the United States, and decided to push for his preferred endgame.
The Russian leader has also done two other things: By deploying his forces, particularly aircraft, he has neutralized any prospective Turkish and American effort to establish a no-fly zone over northern Syria. The Americans, never enthusiastic about such a zone in the first place, will now want to avoid any step that might lead to a confrontation with the Russians.
Putin has also made Russia the West’s principal interlocutor over Syria, when for a long time the assumption was that Iran called the shots in Damascus. This gives Moscow more leverage to shape an eventual political solution to its advantage, while also allowing it to establish a space for itself in the Middle East, despite the belief that the recent nuclear accord with Iran conceded to Tehran a greater regional role.
It’s also very likely that the Assad regime prefers that Russia be its primary sponsor, for a number of reasons. The Russians have an important say at the United Nations; they have an open line to the Americans and Europeans, despite tensions over Ukraine; and the Russians are also engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Arab states, who are more comfortable dealing with Putin than they are with the Iranian regime.
However, all this fails to answer any of the impossible questions that Russian intervention in Syria has raised. While it’s true that the Europeans have shifted somewhat toward accepting that Bashar Assad remain in power during a transitional phase, until now such views have not congealed into a consistent European policy with regard to Syria. Similarly, the Obama administration has behaved in a contradictory fashion by wanting Assad out of office but not in such a way that it will help ISIS.
American and European confusion is not necessarily to Putin’s advantage, though. While he may benefit tactically from this, the Russian president ultimately needs some Western coherence in order to arrive at any comprehensive deal over Syria. Russia cannot resolve the Syrian crisis alone, nor can it force the outcome it desires on all. Any long-term resolution requires a regional consensus, backed by the United Nations, and mechanisms to strong-arm those who hinder a solution.
But what that means is that Russia must either have great confidence that it can impose Assad on the West and most Arab states or it must be willing to backtrack over wanting to keep the Syrian president in place if it fails to do so. The latter seems highly unlikely, but so is Russia’s capacity to hang on to Assad indefinitely. So, regardless of Russia’s daring, it is working on a political plan that probably cannot succeed, wagering that as Syria’s war drags on attitudes toward Assad will change.
Then there is the matter of Russia’s military strategy. As one observer put it, even if Russia’s aim is mainly to boost the Assad regime with airpower, the building of air bases, their protection, as well as logistics may involve the deployment of up to 5,000 personnel. That is a serious investment in a war that has become a quagmire for everyone. Worse, many Russians recall what happened in Afghanistan, so Putin’s backing at home may slowly erode if the Syrian operation begins to sour.
Putin’s only real option is to decisively shift the balance of power on the ground in Assad’s favor. If so, it will mean that Russia’s primary targets will not be ISIS, but the armed groups that pose more of an immediate threat to the regime – in Idlib, Homs, Damascus, and possibly (though improbably) southern Syria. This is already what we are seeing after Russian aircraft bombed Free Syrian Army positions on Wednesday.
However, there is great danger in this. In working to weaken opposition groups militarily, the Russians may effectively help ISIS. For now, groups such as the Nusra Front and its allies act as a barrier to ISIS, regardless of the fact that they may not represent a much more savory alternative. It’s also possible that if the Russians are perceived as acting with the tacit support of the West, militants from the less extremist groups may rally to ISIS, particularly if they begin losing ground.
Far from undermining ISIS, Putin may empower it if the Russians target Assad’s closest enemies. The situation is similar to what is happening with Turkey today. In attacking the Kurds, Ankara is also crippling the major foes of ISIS in northern Syria. No one doubts that ISIS is regarded by Russia as a real menace, but if Putin goes this route his problems may augment tenfold.
Everyone with a say in Syria is now taking maximalist positions, and a major reason for this is the Russian moves in the country. With all sides viewing these as a decisive escalation to end the Syrian war in a way that preserves Assad rule, they have responded with maximalism of their own. Indeed, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubair said this week that either Assad must step down or else he would face a “military option.”
That suggests things will become far worse before they get better. Putin may be clever, but he’s no alchemist. He won’t change the worthless lead of Assad rule into the gold of regime survival. Like everyone else in Syria, he needs to be blindsided by reality. Meanwhile Syrians will continue to die, or depart for Europe. The tragedy is still far from its final act.
Michael Young is op