Will Geagea reshape the political scene? - Michael Young - The Daily Star

 Reports that the Lebanese Forces might endorse Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun as president have shaken an anxious March 14. While some believe that this is a maneuver by the party’s leader, Samir Geagea, it appears to be considerably more than that.

From Geagea’s perspective there are potential advantages to be gained from backing Aoun. First, Aoun is over 80 and his chances of finishing his term are lesser than a younger man’s. By opting for Aoun, Geagea would be in a position not only to pick up a share of the Aounist base, but also position himself as a successor one day.

By backing Aoun Geagea could also claim to have unified Christian ranks, at a time when divisions within the Maronite community have neutralized its ability to shape Lebanon’s political destiny. The Maronites have almost become incidental to the presidency, Geagea must feel, as candidates spring up left and right, selected by non-Maronite politicians. Why not return the initiative to the community, and in so doing burnish his own credentials as a Maronite protector?

In so doing Geagea could also become a kingmaker, and deprive non-Maronite politicians of that cherished role. The reason is that if Geagea votes for Aoun, the latitude of Nabih Berri not to do so would disappear. In a second round of voting Aoun would have a majority. Nor would his rivals in the Future bloc or Walid Jumblatt’s bloc be able to boycott election sessions, not after they have spent the past year and a half condemning the Aounists and Hezbollah for doing so.

A more pertinent question is why would Geagea support Aoun when he entered the presidential contest last year primarily to block Aoun’s election? After all the Franjieh scenario appears out of the question, since Hezbollah has rejected it. The Lebanese Forces can make a good case that voting for Aoun permits them to no longer be disregarded by their purported allies or rivals. When Geagea began a dialogue with the Aounists, nobody in March 14 seemed to notice that the Lebanese Forces had, effectively, redefined their role in the coalition.

It’s no secret that Saad Hariri’s decision to advocate for Sleiman Franjieh’s election only reinforced Geagea’s sense that he would gain more by taking his distance from March 14. While the Lebanese Forces leader has maintained his relationship with the Future Movement, he doubtless feels there is more benefit politically from maintaining an independent stance, allowing him to go in multiple directions depending on where his interests lie.

Geagea may also feel that an understanding with Aoun would allow the two to agree over an election law that benefits them mutually. Geagea probably realizes that approval of an alternative to the 1960 law is unlikely, given that most of the political forces profit from it. Therefore, a Geagea-Aoun accord would allow both to dominate virtually all the Christian political space, in that way facilitating their coordination in an election held on the basis of the law.

The Lebanese Forces campaigned in favor of the Orthodox proposal for two primary reasons: because they feared that another mediocre result like the one in the 2009 elections would permanently sideline them in the Christian community; and because the proposal would have guaranteed them a much larger share of seats than in 2005 and 2009, one commensurate with their following among Christians.

The negative backlash against the abysmal proposal compelled Geagea to look in another direction. Going with Aoun may have just provided it. If the Aounists and the Lebanese Forces move closer, they can form joint electoral lists to their common advantage. Such unity would be sold as an effort to end Christian marginalization and almost certainly garner the approval of the other Christian political forces and Patriarch Beshara Rai in particular.

That is why Franjieh is not in a position to stand against a Geagea-Aoun accord. If Geagea chooses Aoun, Franjieh’s only option would be to withdraw from the presidential race, arguing that he is fulfilling the conditions set by Rai when the patriarch presented a formula to determine which Maronite would become president.

While Hezbollah would officially welcome Aoun’s election, the reality is more complicated. The party championed Aoun because it knew that this was the surest way to prevent an election. The vacuum undermines the current system, strengthening Hezbollah’s bargaining power and allowing it to push forward what is probably its ultimate objective: to amend the post-Taif constitution and enlarge the share of Shiite seats in parliament, government, and civil service.

Yet if Aoun becomes president this equation may change. At least that is the assumption of the Lebanese Forces. If he is president, Aoun would not readily go along with Hezbollah’s preferences and approve of a reduction in Christian shares in the state as defined by the Taif Accord. Once empowered, Geagea assumes, Aoun would develop a different relationship with Hezbollah than he has today. The calculation may prove erroneous, but it follows from the same logic that led Hariri and Jumblatt to swing behind Franjieh.

What Geagea will decide remains, for now, a matter of conjecture. But the Lebanese Forces leader feels that even by merely floating the idea of a Aoun presidency, he has been able to regain the initiative, which he had lost after Hariri’s departure in 2011. In his relationship with Future, this is hardly negligible. Geagea no longer wants to be a poor relative, there only to ratify decisions taken by others. Dismissing his latest efforts as a ploy may be a major error.